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NAMES OF INSTITUTIONS¹

SUMMARY: This paper advances the thesis that the proper names of some institutions, such as the names of universities, heads of state and certain positions or agencies, inherit the linguistic types of the nouns which denote the basic category of the objects that the names refer to, e.g., “university”, “school” or “company”. A reference by those names may select particular aspects of institutions, in the same way that “city” or “book” selects the physical, legal or informational aspects of objects in the extension of the nouns. This view is based on Asher’s and Pustejovsky’s conception of dot-type semantics.

KEYWORDS: names of institutions, dot-type semantics, many aspect-words, direct reference.

1. Introduction

The literature on proper names largely focuses on the proper names of people, such as “Aristotle” or “Barack Obama”. Another often discussed class of names, or at least frequently given as examples, would be the names of cities, e.g., “Dartmouth”. In this paper, I will instead concentrate on the proper names of institutions, i.e., organized social groups, such as political parties, firms, universities, etc. Like cities, institutions are artifacts and thus names of both refer to structured unitary entities whose ontological status is difficult to classi-

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fy (Arapinis, 2013; Baker, 2004; Burazin, 2016; Hilpinen, 1992; 2011; Miller, 2019; Searle, 1995; 2010; Thomasson, 2003; 2007; 2009a; 2009b; 2014 Weinberger, 1991). In this paper, however, I will abstract from such ontological disputes and concentrate on semantic questions, trying to account for systematic uses of names of institutions.

The proper names of both people and places are systematically deployed to refer to objects or events other than their default referents. In (1) “Vietnam” does not refer to the country but to the relevant war:

- (1) He championed civil rights during Vietnam.

Yet an interesting feature of the names of cities and countries is that, in contrast to the proper names of people, whose default referents are the contextually assigned human bearers of the names, the names of cities and countries systematically refer to:²

- geographical territories
- (2) Britain lies under one metre of snow.
- political entities
- (3) Britain has declared war on San Marino.
- groups of people
- (4) Britain mourns the death of the Queen Mother’s corgi.

and even appear to change the referent in one sentence:

- (5) Britain, despite the fact that it is lying under one metre of snow and is mourning the death of the Queen Mother’s corgi, has declared war on San Marino.
- (6) Brazil is a large two-century-old Portuguese-speaking country.

In such examples it is unclear if there is a primary referent or even if there are several distinct referents involved. In this paper I will argue that the proper names of at least some institutions behave similarly, that they are used to refer to different aspects of the institutions they name. In this respect, their semantics is akin to many-aspect words such as “book” or “city”. Most institutions have legal and human/agentive aspects, some also have physical/location aspects. The names of institutions exhibit and combine those aspects:

² Examples (2)–(5) are due to Cruse (2000), (6) is from Arapinis and Vieu’s (2015). Compare also Kijania-Placek’s (2021).

- (7) Charles University was founded in 1348.
- (8) Charles University is situated in the city center.
- (9) Charles University, which was founded in 1348, is situated in the city center.
- (10) The President of the United States signed an executive order to stop unnecessary international travel.
- (11) The President of the United States went skiing abroad.
- (12) The President of the United States went skiing abroad, violating his own executive order.

One may oppose that the President signed the order in his capacity as the President, while he went skiing as a private person. But the anaphoric use of the pronoun “his” in (12) suggests that it was the same entity who signed and went skiing. To argue that it is indeed one referent, I will rely on linguistic evidence taken from attested and constructed examples but will also consult the legal documents which establish the relevant institutions. Thus, by claiming that the institution of The President of the United States has a human aspect, I do not mean merely that the phrase is sometimes used to refer to the actual person who occupies the office when they are performing some activities in their private life, e.g., when he/she marries or goes skiing. I also refer to those human aspects of the institution which are part of the person’s duties and activities as President, yet intrinsically require human features. See the discussion of example (10) in Section 3. I will argue for treating the proper names of institutions as referring to a single referent, in analogy to the treatment of “book”, “city” or “school” in Asher and Pustejovsky’s dot type semantics.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 I briefly explain the concept of an institution that I will be concerned with, and dismiss concerns about treating some phrases as the proper names of institutions. I discuss the issues of the rigidity of the names of institutions and their purported descriptive character. Section 3 deals with grammatical and ontological arguments for treating the proper names of places and institutions as referring to one entity. Section 4 and 5 introduce relevant elements of dot-type semantics and in Section 6 I propose its application for the names of institutions.

2. What Are Institutions, and Do They Have Proper Names?

2.1. What are Institutions?

According to conceptions of institutions encountered in the literature, institutions are usually considered in one of two ways, which I characterize following Arapinis (2013, p. 45):

- (a) institutions are organized social groups, i.e., organizations such as political parties, firms, universities, etc.
- (b) institutions are normative rules that contain prescriptions that forbid, permit, or require some actions or outcomes.

In this paper I am only concerned with proper names of institutions understood as in (a), which arguably involve normative rules within their legal aspect.

2.2. Do Institutions Have Proper Names?

Many of the examples of the proper names of institutions have the form of a definite description, like in

- (13) The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that segregation is unconstitutional.

The form itself should not deceive us, however, as many proper names of countries, including “the United States of America” or “the Netherlands” include the definite article as well. But there is also an important difference between the proper names of institutions and definite descriptions referring to those same institutions, even if the name has the form of a description. “The University of Padua” is the proper name of that renowned institution and the definite description “the university of Padua” refers to it as well. But if the only university in Padua was founded by Mussolini in the 20th century, the name “the University of Padua” would arguably be empty (unless the counterfactual university was named by the same name type), while the description would refer to the newer university. To give one more example, “the university of Prague” refers to Charles University but is not its name. A definite description refers to an institution if that institution uniquely fulfills the descriptive condition, but for a descriptive phrase to become a name of an institution it must be assigned to that institution in an appropriate (legal) way. The name of the most important office in the United States is declared by the US Constitution to be “the President of the United States”. It could have been named differently, e.g., “the President of the United States of America”.³ Although the description “the president of the United States” may refer to the institution in a special context (e.g., if preceded by the words “the institution of”), its default reference is to the current holder of

³ In the case of the institution of the Polish president, the descriptions “the president of Poland” and “the president of the Republic of Poland” are co-referential, but only for the latter there is a name which sounds identical, “the President of the Republic of Poland”, because this is the phrase used to refer to the institution in the Polish Constitution (along with “the President of the Republic” and “the President”). In some cases the naming relation is made explicit, e.g.: “A Court, to be known as the Family Court of Australia, is created by this Act”—(Australian) Family Law Act, 1975. I have borrowed the last example from Gawthorne’s (2013).

that office. Additionally, the default reading of a description in an atomic sentence is made explicit by “the current president of the United States”. In contrast, the name of the institution does not admit of the insertion of “current” and refers to the same institution regardless of who occupies it. This brings us to the question of the rigidity of institutional names.

2.3. The Question of Rigidity

An expression is a rigid designator if it designates the same object in all circumstances of evaluation.⁴ Importantly, Ludwig (2017) argued that the phrase “the Supreme Court” should not be considered a name, because, as it is with other definite descriptions, it could and does refer to different judges at different times. This line of argument is misguided, however, because what it shows, rather uncontroversially, is that the phrase cannot be considered a proper name of the relevant judges. As I have pointed out above, the question I consider in this paper is the semantics of the names of institutions, not of the names of the actual people occupying roles central to those institutions.⁵ For institutional names to be rigid, it is enough that the name refers to the same institution and for the identity of the institution it is not required that the same people occupy an office. In the same way, “the President of the United States” refers rigidly to the institution defined and named by the Constitution of the United States even though the corresponding description is non-rigid and refers to different people in different times and circumstances. Similarly, even if we assume that a university must have a physical location (a building or a group of buildings), for an identity of a university it is not required that it occupy the same building during its existence.⁶

2.4. Are Institutional Names Partially Descriptive?

Although from the fact that different judges may occupy the offices of Supreme Court judges at different times and circumstances it does not follow that “the Supreme Court” considered as a name of an institution is non-rigid, there seem to be important semantic differences between typical proper names and the names of institutions. Simple proper names, such as “Aristotle”, are directly referential, from which it follows that their propositional contributions do not include (truth-conditionally relevant) properties. In contrast, names of institu-

⁴ For simplicity’s sake I do not address the issue of reference in circumstances in which a relevant object does not exist.

⁵ In fact, Ludwig seems to be arguing that the institution of the Supreme Court should be considered identical to the actual people occupying the offices of Supreme Court judges. I will omit these ontological issues from the considerations of this paper.

⁶ In this paper I do not attempt to formulate sufficient and necessary conditions for the identity of institutions, leaving this question to metaphysicians. An interesting account, based on the notions of material, temporal and agentive constitution and the underlying notions of coincidence, has been proposed by Arapinis (2013), and Arapinis and Vieu (2015).

tions seem to contribute properties to the propositions expressed by sentences in which they occur.

An interesting account of what he calls partially descriptive names is given by Soames (2002). Soames proposes that for some complex names, such as “Princeton University”, the common noun contributes directly to the propositional content: “the semantic content of *Princeton University* is a propositional constituent that includes both the property of being a university and the well-known institution of higher learning itself” (Soames, 2002, p. 52, emphasis in the original). I believe the requirement is too strong. As is typical for universities, Princeton University was founded as a college and—as we can learn from Wikipedia—its former name was the “College of New Jersey”. These facts make the sentence:

(14) Princeton University was a college in the 18th century.

literary true, which is difficult to square with a strict reading of Soames’s account. That does not mean, however, that there are no necessary conditions for something to be the referent of “Princeton University”.⁷ Princeton University could be degraded to a college in the future, it could have been a school before becoming a college but arguably could not be just a building which is out of use. If the institution lost all legal status, Princeton University would presumably no longer exist. This suggests that at least the property of being an institution is an essential property of Princeton University. Yet, this is a metaphysical thesis, not a semantic one. For the name to be a rigid designator, the semantic requirement is only that it refers to the same entity and what counts as the same entity in the case of an institution is a question for metaphysics. An analogical argument would work for typical, directly referential names, such as “Aristotle”. Provided the name is used as a name of the philosopher, it could refer to a person who is not interested in pedagogy or philosophy (i.e., it is possible that Aristotle might not have been interested in those topics), but it arguably could not refer to a non-human. However, from this metaphysical fact, if it is one, we do not conclude that the property of being human is a propositional constituent of the name (as used with reference to the philosopher).⁸ Rather, it is a metaphysical requirement for Aristotle to be the entity he is that he is human. By parity of reasoning, I conclude that the requirement of being an institution comes from the identity conditions for Princeton University but it is no part of the propositional constituent of its name.^{9, 10}

⁷ In this section I assume for the sake of simplicity that Princeton University only refers to the relevant university. In principle, nothing prohibits somebody from calling their dog Princeton University. Such a use of the name would obviously not be a name of an institution.

⁸ I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to clarify this point.

⁹ It might be argued additionally that the phrase “Princeton University” has a different modal profile from simple proper names such as “Aristotle” or “Einstein”, because the sentence “if the college founded in 1746 by New Light Presbyterians never became an

3. Against Deferred Reference Interpretation: Grammatical and Ontological Arguments for Treating the Proper Names of Institutions as Referring to One Entity

The referent of “Vietnam” in (1):

- (1) He championed civil rights during Vietnam.

is not the country, but the relevant war associated with the country. This is a case of deferred reference, which involves two distinct objects. Could we consider one aspect of an institution a deferred referent of the name? In what follows, I will argue against such an interpretation.

Deferred reference takes place when we refer to one object by way of using another, where the two objects are connected by a contextually salient relation. Nunberg (1993), who originally characterized deferred reference for indexicals, reserved the term *referent* for the object intended as referent by the speaker, calling the auxiliary object, given by context, an *index*. On Nunberg’s account, deferred reference is constrained by the meaning of an expression, specifying the grammatical features which must be in agreement with either the index or the referent. A paradigmatic example of deferred reference is referring to an author while pointing at a book (Nunberg, 1993):

- (15) She is my chemistry teacher.

The referent—the author—must agree in number, gender and animacy features with those encoded in the meaning of the pronoun used, while the index is given by demonstration (for demonstratives) or by the Kaplanian character (for other

university, Princeton University would not have existed” has a true reading, which shows that the name “Princeton University” has descriptive readings, such as, e.g., “Princeton University as we know it”, “Princeton University as so called”, or “Princeton University as the hub of Nobel Prize winners”. However, simple proper names have predicative and descriptive readings as well, as exemplified by true readings of “if Aristotle never met Plato, Aristotle (the great philosopher we know by this name) would not have existed”, “if Aristotle’s parents had called him Socrates, Aristotle (as the person known by this name) would not have existed”, or of “I love teaching, every time after the summer holidays I hope I will have an Einstein in my class” (cf. Kijania-Placek, 2018). Thus, whatever the modal profile of simple names amounts to, the names of institutions exhibit a similar one.

¹⁰ In the case of the names of legal institutions, such as “the Supreme Court” or “the President of the United States”, it may be argued that the properties stated in the Constitution are the necessary properties of their referents. A consequence of this would be that a change in the Constitution necessarily results in a different (and not just altered) institution, which may be considered counterintuitive. Again, I remain neutral with respect to these metaphysical questions (for an account treating legal discourse in analogy to fictional descriptive names, see Gawthorne, 2013; for arguments against the descriptivist treatment of institutional names, see Banaś, in press).

indexicals). For proper names, the name's grammatical features and the prepositions used must agree with that of the object being referred to. Thus, in (1) the index is the country, and the deferred referent is the Vietnam War. This interpretation is justified by the grammatical requirements of the preposition "during", which requires an eventive complement. Since Vietnam—the country—is not an event, the referent is plausibly the most salient event that corresponds to it. In general, the index for proper names is given by the naming convention which is relied upon in the context and the deferred referent corresponds to the index in a contextually salient manner. The referent must agree with the name in whatever grammatical features the name possesses (cf. Kijania-Placek, Banaś, 2021).

Examples such as (8),

(8) Charles University is situated in the city center.

when considered in English, may seem to be susceptible to the analysis via deferred reference. It seems that we could consider the legal entity to be the default referent of "Charles University" and thus constitute the index, the building being its deferred referent in (8). But testing in languages with more grammatical features that are morphologically marked, such as Czech or Polish, falsifies this hypothesis.¹¹ Since we are aiming at a general theory of proper names of institutions, the proposal should work in any language.

In Polish it is not just personal pronouns and adjectives which are sensitive to the grammatical features of proper names but also demonstratives and verbs (in the past tense). (8) when translated into Polish is (8')

(8') *Uniwersytet Karola* *jest położony* *w środku miasta.*
 Charles University.SG.MSC is situated.ADJ.MSC in center city

and it complies with the constraints of deferred reference. To show this, it is enough to consider the grammatical gender of the adjective. In (8') it is in agreement with that of *building*, which in Polish is masculine. But if the building were a deferred referent in (8), the same interpretation should be applicable to (16):

(16) Polytechnic University of Prague is situated in the city center.

Yet, (16) in Polish is:

(16') *Politechnika Praska* *jest położona* *w centrum miasta.*
 P. U. of Prague.SG.FEM is situated.ADJ.FEM in center city

¹¹ The arguments proposed here mirror Nunberg's arguments against treating some examples involving indexicals ("I am parked out back") as a case of deferred reference. Nunberg relies on translation to Italian (Nunberg, 1995, p. 110).

If the legal entity were the index and the building the deferred referent, the gender of the adjective should again be masculine, in agreement with the grammatical gender of the deferred referent, but it is feminine, in agreement with the subject. This pattern of agreements shows that the gender of the predicate follows that of the subject and not that of the potential referent, in violation of the rules of deferred reference. The superficial compliance in the case of (8) was just a result of a coincidence: the gender of the name was identical to the gender of the purported deferred referent.¹² If (16) were a case of deferred reference, (16') should be infelicitous, because the gender of the verb does not match the gender of the purported deferred referent (the building).

Grammatical considerations alone seem to support a deferred interpretation of (10):

- (10) The President of the United States signed an executive order to stop unnecessary international travel.

If we considered the legal office to be the index and the person occupying it the deferred referent, the gender of verbs would change with the gender of the appointee (in language with appropriate morphological differences), and it does. But there are ontological arguments against interpreting (10) as a case of deferred reference. It is crucial for deferred reference that the index is not identical with the referent. But for the activity of signing documents the requirement is the contrary one: whoever does the signing must be both the legal and the embodied person, collapsing the distinction between index and referent.^{13, 14}

¹² According to Nunberg, the gender in question “is determined by the grammatical gender of the name of the basic-level category to which the referent of the expression belongs, or in the case of animates, usually by the sex of the referent” (1993, pp. 25–26). I follow Nunberg in this paper in understanding the gender agreement requirements.

¹³ In fact, Nunberg (1993) treated direct reference as a special case of deferred reference, where the relation between index and referent is that of identity. However, this is just a terminological issue. In the end I will opt for treating examples such as (10) as a case of direct reference, and my thesis in this section may alternatively be understood as opposing the treatment of some uses of names of institutions as a non-trivial application of deferred reference.

¹⁴ Since in the case of names such as “the President of the United States” only two aspects are postulated (legal vs. physical), a natural question is if we can account for them by extending accounts proposed for such readings of the corresponding descriptions. An interesting account is proposed by Duží, Materna, Jespersen (2010). According to the theory, which is based on Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic (1988), a definite description such as “the president” refers either to the presidential office or to its occupier, depending on whether the description is used in the *de dicto* or *de re* mode. Such an analysis might work for (11) and “the President of the United States is elected every four years” but because the *de dicto/de re* distinction is disjunctive, it does not extend to examples like (10) or (12), which crucially depend on non-disjunctive readings of the name (cf. Duží, Materna, Jespersen, 2010, p. 362, where the *de dicto/de re* distinction for

The felicity of (10) and (12), as well as that of (9) relies on the permeability of aspects connected with the proper names of institutions; a feature the name “Charles University” shares with the noun “university”, which denotes the basic category of the object the name refers to, whatever it turns out to be from the metaphysical point of view. In all of the presented examples, predicates select different aspects of the object in the same way as predication selects for particular aspects in the case of the noun “university”, as well as in the case of “book” or “city”. Some predicates require two aspects for comprehension—again analogically to the predicates “read” and “write” for “book”—the way it is required in (12). In the following sections I base my analysis of proper names of institutions on the treatment of “book”, “city”, and “school” by Asher and Pustejovsky.

4. The Semantic Properties of the Nouns “Book”, “City”, and “School”

Interpretation processes such as deferred reference depend on there being a default sense of a word, which is subject to meaning or reference transfers. Yet for many words there are no principled grounds for distinguishing one sense as default. (Nunberg, 1979; cf. Carston, 2012). An oft-mentioned example is the noun “book”, which has at least two potential primary senses (Bosch, 2007; Carston, 2012; Chomsky, 2000; Pustejovsky, 1995; 2005):

- a physical object
- (17) Mary burned my book on Mahler.
- content, information
- (18) Mary believes all of Chomsky’s books.

These senses (content vs physical object) can be combined in one sentence, as in Chomsky’s (2000) famous example (19) or Asher’s (2011)—(20):

- (19) The book that he is planning will weigh at least five pounds if he ever writes it.
- (20) The book has a purple cover and is the most intelligible introduction to category theory.

(19) requires both aspects for comprehension, as both aspects are selected by the verb “write” (Asher, 2011; Chomsky, 2000; Pustejovsky, 1995). This shows that the two aspects are not disjunctive, which would be typical for homonymous

“the King of France” is rendered as a scope distinction). I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this theory.

senses, and that possibly the default denotation of “book” is the *whole* book, with both of its aspects (Asher, 2011).¹⁵

Similar ideas are put forward by Cruse (he uses the term “facet” for what Asher and Pustejovsky call “aspect”; cf. Asher, 2011; Asher, Pustejovsky, 2005; Cruse, 1986; Dölling, 2021):

- (i) Ordinary speakers are not normally aware of the dual nature of “book”: it has to be pointed out to them (however, once pointed out, it becomes obvious). The default reading of “book” is the combined one.
- (ii) predicates selecting different facets can co-ordinate without zeugma, and there is no normal requirement for speakers to intend, or hearers to identify, only one of the facets, as is the case with true ambiguity.
- (iii) The combined reading functions as a basic level item.
- (iv) Some predicates require both facets to be present: “publish a book”, “John is reading a book” [...].
- (v) The combination may bear a proper name. (e.g., “Britain”). (Cruse, 2000, p. 116)

The properties of “book” are shared by many words; “dictionary”, “newspaper”, “map”, “letter”, “film” or “CD” all have physical and informational aspects; “speech”, “lecture”, “movie” or “play” have eventive and informational aspects; “lunch” and “dinner” concern food as well as the event of eating; “human” and “city” are reported to refer to entities of “dual nature” (Dölling, 2021; see also Asher, Pustejovsky, 2000; Kijania-Placek, 2021; Ortega-Andrés, Vicente, 2019; Pustejovsky, 2005). But duality—e.g., physical object vs content or physical vs eventive—does not suffice to account for the semantic complexity of many words. At least three aspects are required for “newspaper”: copy/physical object (21), information/content (22), and organization/institution/publisher (23):¹⁶

- (21) John spilled coffee on the newspaper.
- (22) That newspaper is full of metaphorical language.
- (23) The newspaper fired its editor.

They can combine in copredication and anaphoric reference:¹⁷

- (24) The newspaper decided to change its format. [physical object vs organization]
- (25) Murdoch’s network has just bought the newspaper you are reading. [organization vs physical object vs content]

¹⁵ In this paper I follow the practice common in the literature on many-aspect words which is to use the term “denotation” as an umbrella term standing for objects in the extension of a word (for common nouns) or objects the words refer to (for proper names).

¹⁶ Examples (21) and (23) are due to Pustejovsky (1995), (22) is due to Copestake and Briscoe (1995).

¹⁷ Example (24) is due to Nunberg (1979), (25)—to Abbott (2013).

The nouns important from the point of view of the topic of this paper are “school”, “bank”, “university”, “parliament”, “church”, “opera”, which designate legal institutions, people involved in those institutions and the buildings those institutions reside in. They seem to designate abstract (most often legal) organizations that group a number of people together and (in many cases) are hosted in a building (cf. Arapinis, 2013). The nouns thus exhibit at least the organization/legal entity aspect (26), the collection of people/agentive aspect (28), as well as the physical/building aspect (27):^{18, 19}

(26) The school hired a new teacher. [legal body]

(27) The school caught fire. [building]

(28) The school took a trip to the lakes. [people]

And the aspects can be combined in one sentence:

(29) This private school, founded in the 18th century, is located in the historical center. [organization vs building]

(30) The school that caught fire was celebrating 4th of July when the fire started. [organization vs building]

In (1995), James Pustejovsky suggested a then novel semantics for the analysis of many aspect words such as “book”, “city”, or “school”. The theory was later developed in a series of works co-authored with Nicolas Asher. In Section 5, I will sketch the main ideas of Pustejovsky’s proposal which are relevant for the aims of this paper and in Section 6 I will deploy the theory to the analysis of the proper names of institutions.

¹⁸ Sources of examples: Dölling (2021) for (26); Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019) for (27); Frisson (2009) for (28), and Arapinis (2013) for (29).

¹⁹ Even more aspects could in principle be considered for school, as exemplified by Frisson (2009, p. 112): “(1) Jocelyn walked to the school. (2) The concerned mother talked to the school. (3) Eve’s little brother is at the school. (4) The school won the match in the last minute. (5) The school took a trip to the lakes. (6) School’s out! (7) “The school was that rare achievement; a family within an institution”. In all these examples, school is being used with a different interpretation; in (1), a reference is made to the building itself; in (2), the mother talked to the school board or maybe phoned the admissions office(r) or someone else, but more than likely did not talk to the brick and mortar school itself; in (3), it is unclear whether school is being used to refer to the place/building or the institution; (4) refers to the school team; (5) to school students and maybe some staff members; (6) to a time period; and (7, taken from the British National Corpus), I will not even attempt to categorize”. Some of these examples may arguably be analyzed by deferred reference or meaning transfer (Nunberg, 1995). In this paper I will only be concerned with the aspects of the words which are related to those aspects of the respective institutions which are constitutive for those institutions being of a certain kind.

5. ●-type Words

Pustejovsky intended to account for the phenomenon of copredication, where two predicates apply to the same argument. In typical cases, predication is only successful if the predicate and its arguments are of compatible types, as in (31), where the predicate “burn” requires an argument to be a physical object, and in (32), where the predicate “end” requires an eventive complement:

- (31) The match burned my fingers.
 (32) The match ended without a winner.

Copredication is unproblematic when the argument fulfills the requirement of both the predicates (33), but typically renders an expression infelicitous if it is not. In particular, copredication does not work with homonymy (34):

- (33) He vandalized and then burned down the shop.
 (34) *The match burned my fingers but ended without a winner.

But characteristically, in cases involving many-aspect words such as “book”, “city”, or “school”, copredication is successful even though the requirements of the predicates are conflicting (Asher, 2011):

- (35) Mary picked up and mastered three books on mathematics.

Thus (35) is perfectly felicitous, even though “pick up” requires a physical object while for “master” an informational one is needed. (36) exemplifies another phenomenon characteristic for those words, which occurs in anaphoric reference:

- (36) John’s mother burned the book on magic before he mastered it.

the first predicate requires the argument be a physical object, while the pronoun “it” refers anaphorically to an informational one—the content of the book.

Pustejovsky (1995) assigns types to all nouns, but argues that copredication phenomena support complex typing for words such as “book” or “school”. Thus, simple types are sufficient for the two meanings of “match”:

*match*₁ [physical object]
*match*₂ [event]

or for the meaning of “proposition”:

proposition [content, informational object]

but many aspect words require complex types, which are called *dot-type* or *•-type* by Pustejovsky. A *•-type* is formed by two or more simple types (simple types are *physical object*, *informational object*, *legal object*, etc.) but are not their ordinary sums.

book [physical object•content]

While many predicates select one of the simple types which constitute the complex type (e.g., 26, 27, and 28), other predicates require an argument of the complex type. The predicates Pustejovsky suggests selects the complex type for “book” are “read” and “write”, which require an object which is physical and informational at the same time.

According to Pustejovsky and Asher (Asher, Pustejovsky, 2005; Pustejovsky, 1995) for *•-type* words the constituent types correspond to aspects of objects denoted by those words and in most cases those aspects are available simultaneously during composition of the meaning of the whole sentence. This, according to the authors, allows for explaining the copredication phenomena.

Asher and Pustejovsky propose to treat all words mentioned in Section 4 as *•-types* but those relevant for our analysis of proper names of institutions are the words “school”, “university”, “bank”, etc. *•* is a binary type construction operator but it can be iterated, as is required by “newspaper”, whose type consist of three simple types and is structured as organization•(content•physical object) (Pustejovsky, 2005). Similarly iterated complex types are required for “city”, “school”, and “university” (Arapinis, 2013; Asher, Pustejovsky; 2000; Pustejovsky, 1998; 2005):

city [people•(territory•political (legal) entity)]
school [physical object•(legal entity•people)]
university [physical object•(legal entity•people)]

The constituent aspects are available for predication, as exemplified by (26)–(30) above, as well as by (37–40):²⁰

- (37) The manifesto was signed by the university. [legal entity vs people]
 (38) I have a meeting with Laura at the university. [building]
 (39) The university in the city center specializes in humanities. [building vs people (staff)]
 (40) The best university of the country has caught fire. [building vs people (staff)]

²⁰ Examples (37), (38), and (40) are those of Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019); (39) is from Arapinis and Vieu’s (2015).

In Section 6 I will argue that proper names of institutions such as universities or agencies inherit the semantics of the respective common nouns and should be analyzed as ●-types.

6. Names of Universities Behave Like the Noun “University”

The thesis I propose here is that the proper names of some institutions, such as the names of universities, agencies, and heads of state are multi-aspect words and that they should be analyzed as Pustejovsky’s ●-type words, in particular as a people●(building/physical aspect●legal entity) types (for names of universities or schools). As we have seen in the case of “book” and “city”, predication can select specific constituent aspects. This is shown by examples repeated from previous sections as well as in the examples presented below:

Charles University [physical object●(legal entity●people)]

- (7) Charles University was founded in 1348. [legal entity]
- (8) Charles University is situated in the city center. [building]

In the examples presented, predication concerns divergent aspects of the respective institutions but none of the aspects seems to be the primary one. They combine in copredication and anaphora:

- (9) Charles University, which was founded in 1348, is situated in the city center. [legal entity vs building]
- (41) “Charles University was founded in 1348 [legal], making it one of the oldest universities in the world [...]. It is the largest and most renowned Czech university [location]. For many years Charles University has been keen to incorporate the results of its research and development work into its teaching [people]” (Charles University, n.d.).

the University of Padua [physical object (building)●(legal entity●people)]

- (42) “The University of Padua is one of Europe’s oldest and most prestigious seats of learning” (University of Padua, n.d.). [legal entity vs physical object]

the Supreme Court of the United States [legal entity●people]

- (13) The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that segregation is unconstitutional. [legal entity●people]

the International Court of Justice [physical object●(legal entity●people)]

- (43) “The International Court of Justice, which has its seat in The Hague, is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations” (The International Court of Justice, n.d.). [legal entity vs. physical object]
- (44) “The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN). It was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began work in April 1946 [legal]. The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for terms of office of nine years by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council [people]” (The Court, n.d.).

the President of the United States [legal entity●human]

- (10) The President of the United States signed an executive order to stop unnecessary international travel. [legal entity●human]
- (11) The President of the United States went skiing abroad. [human]
- (12) The President of the United States went skiing abroad violating his own executive order. [legal entity●human]
- (45) “When you are President of the United States and widely regarded as among the most thoughtful and eloquent speakers on the planet, it must be hard to watch someone go on TV and speak for you” (Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 1/17/17). [human]
- (46) “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America [legal]. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years [human]. In Case of the Removal of the President from Office [legal vs human], or of his Death [human], Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office [human], the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected [legal vs human]” (U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 1, amend. XXV).
- (47) “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it [legal vs human], but if not he shall return it” (U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 7).

I have suggested a dot-type semantics for the analysis of some kinds of uses of institutional names, such as “the International Court of Justice”, “Charles University” or “the President of the United States”. I have argued that certain kinds of uses of institutional names inherit the linguistic types of the nouns which denote the basic category of the objects the names refer to, e.g., “universi-

ty”, “school” or “company”. The thesis should not be understood, however, as identifying the semantics of a name of a university (e.g., “Princeton University”) with the definite description “the university”, even in contexts in which the two expressions denote the same object. Although the true values of sentences differing only in those expressions coincide in non-intensional contexts, the propositional contributions of coreferring names and definite descriptions are not identical. While the propositional contribution of the description includes the property of being a university, the property is not included in the case of the name (Section 2.4 above). I thus propose that in the kind of uses exemplified by (7)–(12) and (41)–(47), the proper names of institutions directly refer to their objects of reference, regardless of whether the focus is on the physical, legal, or agentive aspects of the referents.²¹ Dot-type analysis allows the complex nature of reference relations to be explained without postulating multiple referents. The exact nature of the objects which institutional names refer to is a question I will leave to the metaphysicians.

7. Conclusion

In this paper I have proposed a dot-type based interpretation of the proper names of (some) institutions. Among the aspects of an institution that enter the semantics of its name I only include those which are constitutive for its being an institution of a certain type. The aspects distinguished are thus those labelled *physical/building*, *agentive/people* and *legal*. Different aspects may be required for proper names of kinds of institutions other than those considered and the physical aspect in particular is arguably not required for many institutions. Further work is thus needed to ascertain if the proposal is adequate as a general theory of names of institutions.

I opened the paper with an analogy between proper names of cities and that of institutions, but arguably cities themselves are just a special kind of institution. The complex, multifaceted nature of the referents of the names of institutions, including cities, can be traced back to them being social artifacts. A natural extension of the proposal would thus be a semantics of other institutional names, and of other artifacts, such as artworks. This, however, is a project for another paper.

²¹ By postulating that the referent of institutional names allows for the predication of both material and legal properties—for proper names such as “the President of the United States”—I go against theorists who assume that the referent of a legal name is an abstract object (e.g., Marmor, 2014; Gawthorne, 2013; Burazin, 2016; Banaś, in press).

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